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Abstract 
Inventing is fundamental to mathematical activity, should one be a professional 
mathematician or a primary school student. Research on mathematical creativity 
generally is organized along three axes according to its focus on the final product, 
the overall process, or the individual person. Through these conceptualizations, 
however, research rarely considers how mathematical actions themselves are 
fundamentally creative. In this article, we conceptualize mathematical actions as 
inherently creative of the activity within which professional mathematicians and 
primary school students experience (some) mathematics for a first time. To make 
our case, we develop the microanalysis of an exemplary episode of third -grade 
geometry (age 8–9 years) in which two children and an adult work with a tangram 
set. Our analysis characterizes inventing (in) geometry as a serendipitous, open-
ended experience of working with traces in the receiving and the offering of 
something novel. In concluding, we propose considering that inventing in early 
geometry is also inventing geometry itself: an inventing-in-the-act which also result 
in being invented as a (professional or school) geometer. 
Keywords: Creativity, invention, student, geometry, phenomenology  
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Resumen 
Inventar es clave para la actividad matemática, tanto si uno es matemático/a 
profesional, como estudiante de primaria. La investigación sobre creatividad 
matemática generalmente se organiza alrededor de 3 ejes según el producto final, el 
proceso general, o la persona. A través de estas conceptualizaciones la investigación 
raramente considera cómo las acciones matemáticas en sí mismas son creativas. En 
este artículo las acciones matemáticas  se conceptualizan como inherentemente 
creativas en la actividad que tanto los/as matemáticos/as profesionales, como los 
estudiantes de primaria, experimentan por primera vez. Para desarrollar nuestra 
investigación llevamos a cabo microanálisis de un episodio experimental en 3º de 
geometría (8-9 años de edad) donde dos niños y un adulto trabajan con un juego de 
tangram. Nuestro análisis caracteriza inventing en geometría como una experiencia 
fortuita y abierta a partir de trabajar con trazos  como algo novedoso. Proponemos 
considerar que inventar en geometría inicial es también inventar la geometría 
misma: un proceso de inventar-en-la-situación que da lugar a inventarse como 
geómetra (profesional o estudiante).   
Palabras clave: Creatividad, invención, estudiantes, geometría, fenomenología
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nventing has long been a concern in mathematics, with Hadamar as 
one of the most well-known figure in this history. Research in 
mathematics education is also often concerned with questions of 
invention and creativity, and some scholars go as far as to say that even in 
school, the essence of mathematics is creative thinking (Dreyfus & 
Eisenberg, 1996). Inventing (in) mathematics is also at the heart of the 
realistic mathematics education movement, in which “context problems can 
function as anchoring points for the reinvention of mathematics by the 
students themselves” (Gravemeijer & Doorman, 1999, p. 111, our 
emphasis). Recently, three lines of discourse about mathematical creativity 
have been identified according to a focus on (a) the final product, (b) the 
overall process, or (c) the individual person (Liljedahl & Allan, 2013).  In 
the first case, “creativity is assessed on the basis of the external and 
observable products” (p. 1233), and it is the originality of the “thing” itself 
that constitutes the heart of the matter. The second discourse pays greater 
attention to the conditions within which such things come about, and is 
concerned with “phases” such as inspiration, incubation, and realization 
through which the process of inventing is carried on—sometimes including 
the social dimension that is at work in the approbation of problems and 
solutions within the community (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). The third 
focus is on the traits and habits of those individuals considered to be 
particularly inventive. Many test of mathematical creativity have been 
developed over the years along those axis (e.g., Evans, 1964; Balka, 1974; 
Haylock, 1984; Mann, 2006). 
 One area, however, has received little attention in mathematics 
education: the actual work in the instant of inventing and especially in terms 
of ordinary, everyday creativity (Mann, 2006; Runco, 2004). How can 
“ordinary” mathematical action be creative in essence? Getting closer to 
how mathematical invention concretely/observably takes place, research 
inquiring into the heuristics of mathematical activity give texture to what 
creative mathematical work might actually look like. For example, five 
principles in relation to creativity in mathematical work have been 
identified (e.g., Sriraman & Dahl, 2009): (a) the experienced of sudden 
inspiration, (b) the following of aesthetic appeal, (c) the offering of ideas, 
(d) the widening of considerations, and (e) the welcoming of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. It is quite possible to imagine such moments as part of the 
work of, for example, students dwelling on a geometry problem. The 
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concatenation of professional mathematicians and school children might 
first seem hasty, but we follow in this Hadamar’s (1945) suggestion to 
consider that “[b]etween the work of the student who tries to solve a 
problem in geometry or algebra and a work of invention, one can say that 
there is only a difference of degree, a difference of level, both works being 
of a similar nature” (p. 104). Thus, for the conceptualization of a more 
fleshed and blooded account of inventing in mathematics generally, we 
might also investigate what happens when mathematicians are thinking. 
Putting forward the double ascension of from abstract to concrete and from 
concrete to abstract as essential to those moments when mathematics is 
created (Roth & Hwang, 2006), Zhang (2013) moves us toward this. 
Another lead for the conceptualization of everyday mathematical actions as 
inventive is found in the observation that “the environment is itself a source 
for ideas” (Runco, 1993, p. 5). A recent study close to our concerns 
conceptualizes mathematical inventiveness based on Châtelet’s insights on 
the physical nature of mathematical activity (Sinclair, de Freitas, & Ferrara, 
2013). In their study, the authors identify creative acts at the classroom 
level as the “[introduction] of the new in an unpredictable way that 
transgresses current habits of behavior and exceed existent meanings” (p. 
252). Through this take on creativity in mathematics education, the authors 
however perpetuate a tendency to situate creative moments in relatively 
objective “special instants” in which creativity is thought to take place. That 
is, these authors still situate inventing as characteristic of unordinary (series 
of) actions. Conversely, in this study we introduce the notion of inventing-
in-the-act, that is, in the most mundane moment of doing something 
mathematical.  
 Well aware of the numerous ways in which creativity can be defined—
over 100 were identified in one study (Treffinger, Young, Selby, & 
Shepardson, 2002)—our intent is not to define creativity in mathematics, 
but rather to expand the range of phenomena in which mathematical 
invention is considered. Following Merleau-Ponty’s (and others, as we see 
below) insights, we do so from a phenomenological perspective, starting 
from the micro-analysis of an episode in which two children and an adult 
work with a tangram set as part of the mathematics curriculum requirement 
to have children replicate composite 2-D shapes. As the analysis unfolds, 
we thus approach inventing (in) geometry from the ground up, 
progressively conceptualizing inventing-in-the-act as the serendipitous, 
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open and ongoing experience of working with traces. In section 2, we draw 
on this first hand experience of inventing to bring forth its theorisation as 
we can read it across various literature including Derrida, Châtelet, 
Kadinsky, and others. 
 
Inventing-in-the-Act: Case from an Early Geometry Lesson 
 
In his book about the invention of the double helix model of the DNA 
structure, James Watson recalls his sudden realization of pieces of a puzzle 
fitting together while moving about physical shapes of four bases that were 
known to be part of the DNA molecule: 
[I] began shifting the bases in and out of various other pairing 
possibilities. Suddenly I became aware that an adenine-thymine 
pair held together by two hydrogen bonds was identical in shape to 
a guanine-cytosine pair held together by at least two hydrogen 
bonds. All the hydrogen bonds seemed to form naturally; no 
fudging was required to make the two types of base pairs identical 
in shape. (Watson, 2012, pp. 207–208) 
 In this statement, Watson emphasizes the becoming aware of something 
that resulted from his actions without being intentionally constructed as 
such. Watson’s invention thus consisted in recognizing something 
significant and unforeseen in what he had done before. That is, his 
realization of the new followed its production. This episode is helpful in 
rethinking how we approach inventing in mathematical activity, stressing 
the importance of fully considering how, for example, it is commonly 
realized by students in and as the act of doing geometry, when they find 
mathematics in the shapes they produce. To illustrate such inventing-in-the-
act to phenomenological account for inventing (in) early geometry, we 
describe a fragment of a lesson in a second grade classroom in which pupils 
were prompted to produce a series of composite figures (a square, an 
oblong, etc.) from a tangram set (Fig. 1). In the fragment we selected Nelly 
and Kelly, who manipulate triangles of various size, and subsequently 
identify and attend to different configurations that had resulted from their 
actions. The two girls were videotaped by an early childhood educator 
(Mary), who also takes an active part in the girls’ work. 
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Figure 1. The task and the expected solutions. 
 
 The lesson fragment beings with Nelly stating that she “made a very 
very interesting shape” made of loosely arranged pieces (fig. 2). After 
saying this, she keeps moving the pieces as if she wanted to adjust them 
more neatly. Mary then jumps in, apparently trying to help her, and then 
steps back with a “no,” as if she realized that the pieces could not be tidily 
fitted. At the same time, Nelly also changes her orientation, pushing away 
some of the shapes and apparently starting up on something new. She 
begins with adjusting a non-rectangular parallelogram piece and a medium 
triangle. She then adds a small triangle (called in the lesson “the missing 
piece”) [fig. 3a], and observing that “they fit together,” continues her 
bricolage (“And then”) with the addition of a third triangle. In a high-
pitched voice, Mary comments: “A boat!” while Nelly adds a fifth piece 
which completes the configuration as a convex hexagon, stepping back 
from her creation, while Mary keeps commenting: “Ohhh! Interesting!” We 
then notice another change in Nelly’s work when she points to the vertices 
following a statement about counting “the sides.” As Nelly reaches “6,” the 
configuration is called “hexagon,” and Kelly adds: “a true hexagon.” Mary 
seems to confirm this result by stating “Another one!” before encouraging 
the girls to move on and “see if you can make the rectangle one.” 
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Nelly: I made a very very interesting shape! [fig 2] 
Nelly goes back to the pieces and gently moves them. 
Mary: Or maybe here, you know… and… no… 
Mary reaches to the pieces; also moving them gently, and 
then steps back.  
Nelly then pushes away some of the triangles and starts 
adjusting the parallelogram and the medium triangle, and 
then adds a small one [fig. 3a]: 
Nelly: Here I’m using the missing piece [fig. 3], they fit 
together! And then [adding an other small triangle] 
Mary: A boat! [Nelly keeps going, adds an other triangle, 
fig. 4, and then briefly pauses] Ohh! Interesting! 
Nelly: Lets count the sides. 1,2,3,4,5,6 [pointing to the 
vertices]. An oc… 
Kelly and Mary: Hexagon 
Nelly: Hexagon. 
Kelly: A true hexagon [flipping through the sheets where 
they drew the figures they previously found] 
Mary: Another one! Now see if you can make the 
rectangle one. 
Nelly: I’m gonna put this put keep it safe so it doesn’t 
wreck [placing 2 large triangles on opposite sides of the 
hexagon, fig. 5] 
Sally: That’s a ribbon. 
Mary: Oh it’s beautiful, yeah. 
Nelly turns the two triangles in a symmetrical (but 
opposite!) movement and then quickly flips one over [fig 
6]. 
Nelly: What did I made, an airplane or something? 
Sally: Hum, yeah. Trace it now. 
Nelly: I can’t. Someone has to hold these so I can oh 
[sliding the central, hexagonal part towards her, and then 
disturbing the puzzle]. I cant… It’s ok, I think I can 
remember it [placing triangles on her sheet]. I forgot my 
memory now [taking apart what she was doing, and then 
re-starting from the first 2, 3 shapes she began with, fig, 
7]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Nelly’s very 
very interesting shape. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Nelly adding 
the missing piece. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Adding 
another triangle. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Keeping it 
safe. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. An airplane? 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 
Experiencing “me-
mory loss” 
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 In the last part of the fragment, we see Nelly preserve the hexagonal 
configuration (“I’m gonna put this put keep it safe so it doesn’t wreck”) by 
enclosing it with 2 other large triangles, the result of which Kelly declares 
to be “a ribbon.” But there is only a very short pause before Nelly moves 
the last two pieces, first rotating them in a symmetrical fashion hence 
producing a clearly unsymmetrical figure from an apparently symmetrical 
one, and then flips the left-hand piece over (figure 6). Commenting on the 
result, she utters in a questioning fashion “What did I made, an airplane or 
something?” to wich Sally responds “Hum, yeah. Trace it now.” Nelly 
answers saying that she cannot do it, while trying to slide her configuration 
on a sheet of paper. She ends up completely disturbing the organisation, and 
apparently try to put it back together, but does not achieve it.  
 Provided that we accept to approach this episode in terms of inventing, 
and generally consider that inventing can be thought about from a 
phenomenological perspective, as inventing-in-the-act, what can be said 
about such phenomena? In the following subsections, we discuss three 
aspect of inventing-in-the-act as it takes place in those children’s doing of 
mathematics. Following this analysis, we turn to the literature to situate and 
add consistency to those first-level observations. 
 
Inventing as Serendipitous 
 
In this episode, Nelly appears to be both playing with the shapes and 
moving towards recognizable, yet undefined and certainly unstated 
configurations from which an identification could be made—much like 
Watson might have appeared to an observer. Taking the perspective of 
inventing-in-the-act we might say that the shapes Nelly produces are in a 
sense true inventions: they come out of her exploration with the pieces and 
do not resemble any of the “models” presented at the beginning of the 
lesson. While possibly trying to make “something” that might or might not 
have been specific (e.g. a square) with the tangram pieces, she suddenly 
stops in the face of a configuration that reveals itself to her as an 
“interesting shape,” which eventually becomes a “hexagon” that turns into a 
ribbon and airplane before its inadvertent disintegration. Inventing-in-the-
act thus appears as a (series of) serendipitous events, as moments marked 
up in the flow of mathematical exploration (adjusting pieces together, 
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reorienting them, etc.) out of which something not precisely intended 
emerges. 
 The fortuitous nature of the find appears particularly important in at 
least two ways. If Nelly were to merely construct, as from a plan, the 
configuration we see her creating in this episode, it would make little sense 
to call it inventing. Inventing-in-the-act thus refers to the opened-ended and 
indeterminate feature of mathematical doings, and the idea that we do not 
fully intend our creations, while nevertheless acting in a way that makes 
their realization possible. Inventing-in-the-act means trying out 
possibilities, offering oneself something to work with, and then seizing it 
for further exploration. In a different way, it thus also applies to 
circumstances in which one moves toward a more precise product, while 
finding oneself having to “discover” a way to do so. An example of this can 
be found earlier in the lesson, when Nelly explicitly tries to make the fourth 
figure presented on the board as stated in the lesson goals. She is then 
clearly in the situation of having to invent a method to (re)produce the 
configuration (rather than inventing a figure). Trying out possibilities and 
even pushing them to the limit, we see her at some point partially 
superposing two shapes. As a result, the expected figure briefly appears (its 
outline at least), but Nelly quickly rejects the procedure (and its outcome), 
and continues her search. The way by which the configuration is to be 
produced has yet to be found, stumbled across and, once it shows up, 
recognized as something valuable. This last example thus also takes us to 
the second aspect by means of which inventing is not only in part 
unintentional, but also propitious. Had Nelly taken the superposition 
technique as an acceptable part of realizing shapes, it would have counted 
(in her experience, that is from a phenomenological perspective) as 
inventing a (new) way, a mathematical procedure, to arrive at the 
configuration. Inventing-in-the-act thus also requires this sort of recognition 
without which emerging forms can hardly be regarded as being invented. 
Nelly gives us examples of this positive disposition toward what one comes 
across when she highlights the apparition of the “interesting shape” and the 
“hexagon” configuration, and which in fact also orient us toward their 
identification qua invention. 
 It seems important, however, not to reduce the recognition of an 
invention to some sort of conscious reflective action. Recognition can also 
be found, for example, in repetition: when someone does something first, 
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and then keeps doing it without necessarily stepping back thinking “I’m 
going to do it this way from now on.” In fact, recognition (again) also is a 
first cognition, namely of the repetition of something that is cognized for a 
second time. Thus, it is precisely the absence of such repetition that allows 
us to comment on Nelly’s “not inventing” superposition as an acceptable 
move. Moreover so, what we refer to as reflective consciousness also has an 
unintended, serendipitous aspect to it. We mostly find ourselves realizing 
that something works or does not, and only rarely objectively (observably) 
engage in reflexive thinking. In this case, there is for instance no evidence 
that Nelly reflexively invented the superposition as a “non-acceptable” 
technique. Had she (or Kelly, or Mary!) commented on the move, this 
would be a different story. It is of course possible that Nelly did tell it to 
herself, but the only recognition we have access too is the non-reappearance 
of the move. 
 
Inventing as Open Ended 
 
Another important aspect of inventing-in-the-act is its open-endedness. The 
transcript shows many instances of how the configuration created by Nelly 
are never simply present, but always in the course of becoming, 
fundamentally in the making (Roth, 2014a). The “interesting shape” for 
example is only virtually present: Nelly and Mary move to something else 
without actually fitting the pieces together. That is, even if (from a 
phenomenal perspective) a configuration seemed to exist for them both, it 
was yet to be attained, something to work on, to work with. Inventing then 
is not, as we might think, limited to the find. The “interesting shape” is one 
for which no name or pattern are easily identified, hence its deictic rather 
that descriptive label. Something is given, but what that something holds is 
still unknown. Such open-endedness of inventing-in-the-act can also be 
observed following the emergence of the “hexagon” shape in the middle of 
the episode. The apparition of the configuration is evocative of something 
that is at the very same time present and absent: something still to be 
brought forth. The hexagon that might already reveal itself to Mary (or the 
reader) as a hexagon does not necessarily have that specific quality (yet) for 
Nelly. She found something, and now explores that thing that she made. 
When Nelly pauses (accompanying Mary’s “Oh, interesting”) and 
announces “Lets count the sides,” she engages in a mathematical 
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observation (the counting of sides/vertices) of what was found: from this 
the status of the find as a hexagon is produced. That is, we have to think of 
inventing-in-the-act as unfinished and ongoing. Nelly moves from one 
invention to another, which can also be the inventing the invention as 
something else, as something more. Following what seems like the 
recognition of a convex figure (what we see in fig. 3 is also a hexagon), 
something called a hexagon is made present, again re-invented through 
Kelly’s intervention: it is not only a hexagon, but a “true hexagon” (perhaps 
alluding to the nearly regular aspect of the configuration).  
 At the same time, the dis-closure of inventing-in-the-act also signifies 
fragility and temporality. When Nelly notes the emergence of an 
“interesting shape” and actively attends to it, she does so despite the non-
existence of a configuration in which the pieces would “fit” in the way we 
generally expect (tangram) puzzles to be made. Nelly thus invents a shape 
that cannot be fully actualized, an ephemeral invention that lasts exactly as 
long as it could be worked with as such. But from the moment one receives 
the impression that what seems to be there cannot be actually realized, the 
invention disappears. Open-endedness is thus also in regard to a potential 
disappearance, while inventing-in-the-act might only fleetingly assemble 
something as an invention. More so, whereas for Mary that invention soon 
has been lived through (“Now see if you can make the rectangle one”), 
Nelly and Kelly seem to experience it otherwise. Another powerful 
example of this happens at the end of the episode, when the hexagonal 
configuration is lost. As if there where still something about the 
arrangement that had to be encountered (i.e., its existence as that specific 
disposition of tangram pieces), Nelly gives the impression to be stifled by 
its disorganization. The presence of a convex hexagon appears to be very 
fragile, almost vibrant, still very much alive. Hence Nelly’s stated concern 
with safekeeping the configuration (“I’m gonna put this put keep it safe so 
it doesn’t wreck”), which suggests that it is still somehow elusive to her. 
The discovery needs to be preserved because it can disappear like the word 
that remains at the tip of the tongue in its absence/presence, meaning that 
inventing-in-the-act does not guaranty the permanence of what is invented. 
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Inventing as Tracing 
 
A third element we bring into light for this first conceptualization of 
inventing-in-the-act concerns traces. While “tracing” can mean finding or 
discovering by investigation (e.g. the police traced the missing van), the 
word also connotes all the marks, sings, prints, and residues that so 
remarkably play in our episode. Arrangements of tangram pieces, in their 
material dispositions on the table, are traces with which we observe 
inventing taking place. In other segments, we also see, e.g., the children 
drawing their find on paper, which is a form a traces closer to what we most 
spontaneously think of as marks of mathematical work. Observing how the 
girls actually transact with those traces highlights their dual role with 
respect to inventing: tracing is both the origin and the conclusion, the 
constituent (as in raw material, the medium) and the product of inventing-
in-the-act. 
 The “interesting shape” Nelly initially finds—just as the convex 
hexagonal configuration that follows her moving around the tangram 
pieces— will result in something eventually identified as relevant. From 
configuration to configuration, even starting with one or two pieces placed 
on the table, inventing creates traces with which the girls move forward, 
adding to or removing from arrangements, repositioning and so on. And in 
a certain way, those traces are also the resting place in which inventing is 
reified. The hexagonal configuration is the material proposition of a 
hexagon made of tangram pieces they discovered so much so that its loss 
made the find unrecoverable. But with this disappearance, it would not be 
fair to say that everything has gone. Traces are also in the memory of 
inventing, including the verbal and gestural (amongst others) traces left 
behind. Although Nelly did not, this time, remember the configuration, it is 
quite reasonable to think that she would have been able to recall that “a 
hexagon” was made, and describe the invention in certain ways. This 
naming of a figure is thus another way in which inventing-in-the-act is 
observable here. Exploring the hexagon by tracing out its contour through 
counting with the vertices and them calling it a “hexagon,” naming the 
figure is an action that we might describe as half cognition, half 
recognition: it is both a thinking of the new as some thing created and a 
recalling of some thing(s). Both parts of the action are essential to inventing 
the figure as a hexagon. The case of the “interesting shape” is quite 
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convincing in that matter: something that is not even “fully” present in the 
material disposition of the pieces stands out when Nelly calls it “a very very 
interesting shape.” This shows that as tracing, inventing-in-the act hinges 
on a difference between the inventing as ongoing and those traces it 
proceeds from and arrive at. The difference here appears as a surplus, the 
traces of inventing bringing in the action more than what the action brought 
to the traces. Nelly created a configuration, which turned out to be 
hexagonal, just as something like a “true” hexagon was spotted by Kelly in 
this ‘almost’ regular configuration, and just as an interesting shape emerged 
from the verbal trace of naming it even though that shape was and remained 
materially absent. In a essential way, the physical fitting of the shapes 
coming together in a tangram puzzle is always very approximate, and no 
clear line can be drawn between the shapes (mal-) adjustment in Nelly’s 
“very very interesting shape” and the formation of vertices in the hexagon 
configuration (especially the top one, on fig. 4), as illustrated in the famous 
puzzle invented by Lewis Carol, where a tinny unfit is sufficient to give the 
illusion that 64 = 65  (fig. 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Lewis Carol’s puzzle suggests that 8x8 = 5x13 
 
 From a phenomenological perspective, naming a “shape” from spread-
out tangram pieces, or sides and corner from more or less adjusted plastics 
blocs requires discovering, unveiling those concepts in material 
arrangements. We might thus want to take this as an extreme case for 
inventing-in-the-act, one that takes into account as instances of inventing all 
forms of (mathematical) interpretations, all cases of working with traces to 
bring about something that springs from traces but at the same time 
constitutes something new to the ongoing experience. 
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Inventing (in) Early Geometry: Reinventing Invention from a 
Theoretical Standpoint 
 
Prégnance: les psychologues oublient que cela veut dire pouvoir 
d'éclatement, productivité (praegnans futuri), fécondité (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, p. 258) 
 
In the preceding section, we show how inventing-in-the-act manifests itself 
in the traces of children’s activity. From a phenomenological perspective, 
we see little if any difference between those experiences and Watson’s 
recollection of his sudden awareness that DNA bases could be assembled to 
make identically shaped pairs. That is, a fine-grained study of mathematical 
acts blurs the everyday distinction between a small, personal invention and 
largely recognizable creations. Such observation might even take us to 
question Hadamar’s (1945) suggestion of a “difference of degree” between 
the student’s and the professional mathematician’s work of inventing. But 
more importantly, our analysis exhibits the inherently creative nature of 
doing mathematics, observable in most “ordinary” episode of young 
children doing mathematics (including composing shapes from tangram 
pieces), when inventing-in-the-act reveals itself as the serendipitous, open 
and ongoing experience of working with traces. In this section, we turn to a 
literature rarely considered in mathematics education research concerned 
with creativity to show how these observations can be theorized as 
inventing (in) early geometry, thus reinventing invention from a theoretical 
standpoint. 
 In everyday language, inventing means either creating something that 
did not exist before or the making up of something. For example, it is often 
heard that the Greek invented geometry, but this statement is also an 
invention especially since we know that many of those “Greeks” (e.g. 
Aristotle, Herodotus, Democritus) themselves believed that geometry was 
invented by the Egyptians (e.g., Anglin & Lambek, 1995). Taken as 
devising, inventing also often evokes discovering the solution to a more or 
less well defined problem—e.g., the invention of dynamic geometry 
software somehow “solves” the problem of animating geometrical 
constructions in the way Nicolet or McLaren did in their films. Invention 
may also refer to the identification of something that was already there 
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although not “as such”: in the garbage can model of invention, the solution 
precedes the problem to which it becomes the invention (Roth, 1995). 
 In the preceding description, we note a dialectic of finding | being-found 
dialectic at the heart of inventing-in-the-act. This aspect is necessary to 
account for the passive, unconscious, unintentional dimension in 
mathematical creation (Hadamar, 1945; Pointcaré, 1952; Sriraman & Dahl, 
2009). The non-teleological approach to inventing emphasizes the dual 
nature of mathematical doing: intended and unintended. For example, 
Pointcaré (1952) insisted on the importance of voluntary effort—which is 
“absolutely fruitless and whence nothing good seems to have come 
[thereof]” (p. 27)—as a condition for fruitful unconscious work. In this 
way, blind exploration, random trials, and sterile lines of action sometimes 
do produce events that lead to an unexpected breakthrough. The inherent 
excess in any intentional action is an immediate source of potential 
discovery through which inventing is finding what was there to be found. 
As the Watson episode shows, inventing means being affected by a 
“something” that he somehow managed to put together unintentionally. If 
inventing is finding something for the first time, to invent is first of all the 
experience of finding, it is finding oneself in the presence of something 
(Derrida, 2007). Rorty (1989) writes about how poets inventing new 
language cannot say what they are doing until they have done it, and yet 
this identification of the language once it has arrived as new is also 
fundamental to its existence as such. Otherwise it would only be an 
evolution or an expansion of language, not an invention per se. 
 In the lesson fragment, Nelly comes upon something that in part has 
resulted from her movements. To come [Lat. venīre] upon [Lat. in-] is to 
invent (in German: erfinden, from er-, prefix marking success + finden, to 
find), to find something (unexpected). The etymological roots of the verb 
invent go far back to the Proto-Indo-European gʷā-, gʷem- to go, to come, 
to come to the world, to be born. That is, in the movement that we call 
inventing, something (inherently new) comes to be born that had not existed 
before and that did not foresee its own coming. One interesting take on this 
is that of epistemic actions (e.g. Baltag, 1999): actions performed to change 
the states of affairs (as opposed to specifically goal-oriented actions). What 
is found through largely unintended movements transcends any intent to 
create something as the term is commonly understood: inventing as the 
production of new mathematical possibilities is like a bifurcation point 
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where new system states emerges that could not be anticipated from the 
previous states, a continuity and discontinuity simultaneously (Roth, 
2014b). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) mentions that “when a ‘good’ 
form appears it either modifies its environment by its radiation or obtains 
from my body movements until …” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 259). This 
gives us a new understanding of the observations that the environment can 
be a source of ideas (Runco, 1993), now reconceptualised phenol-
menologically.  
 In the episode, we observe how a surplus in the traces of inventing keeps 
calling, imposing itself as something “unsolved.” Something is there to 
work with, traces, and in this work of inventing we can appreciate the 
“dance of agency,” in the pieces to pieces craft, involving all material 
“bodies” (de Freitas & Sinclair, 2013) contributing to actual mathematical 
doings. This is also consistent with an enactivist account of creating/ 
inventing the world that we live in as an emerging feature of our socio-
material encounters (e.g. Maturana, 2009), where the generative power of 
making something new cannot be limited to situations in which a clear line 
can be drawn between some before and after. As an in-between involving 
presence and absence, the old and the new, inventing-in-the-act requires the 
active | passive aspect of being disposed to(ward), of responding. 
Conceptually, the opening created by this superabundance is, in its very 
strangeness, a form of otherness. Phenomenologically, it thus represents the 
intrusion of the virtual found to be essential to mathematical invention 
(Châtelet, 1993). And the surplus coming with inventing then has to be 
viewed as the creation of opportunities: inventing-in-the-act is the opening 
of the space of the possible. 
 There is a fundamental contradiction inherent to inventing: the arrival of 
something impossible which becomes a source for new possibilities. In a 
recent study on mathematical inventiveness drawing on Sinclair, de Freitas 
and Ferrra (2013) discuss this at the classroom level, showing how 
inventing demands bringing forth what was not present before and “without 
given content in that its meaning cannot be exhausted by existent 
meanings” (p. 242). In his deconstruction of the concept, Derrida also 
arrived at such an observation: “[invention] would be in conformity with its 
concept, with the dominant feature of the word and concept ‘invention,’ 
only insofar as, paradoxically, invention invents nothing, when in invention 
the other does not come, and when nothing comes to the other or from the 
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other” (Derrida, 2007, p. 44). Invention of the impossible is the only 
possible invention, which then “has to declare itself to be the invention of 
that which did not appear to be possible” (p. 44). The configuration Nelly 
found is not only an undetermined actualization on “the difference between 
creative acts of actualizing versus logical inferences that realize the 
possible” (Sinclair et al., 2013, p. 250): It is also the self-revelation of 
something already there, suddenly dis-covered as the result of indeterminate 
epistemic actions that seek rather than already know. As long as a 
configuration—Watson’s base pairs, Nelly’s hexagon—up to its 
appearance, remains unforeseen, nothing is invented; and a soon as it 
appears, it is too late already since this appearance automatically completes 
the declaration: the configuration is heard, seen, received, and responded to, 
re-cognized, and thus offered up as an object of consciousness. 
 As an unfinished and inherently open experience, inventing-in-the act 
thus have the features of an event*-in-the-making (Roth, 2013), which is 
precisely concerned with unpredictability, excess over intention, and 
temporal-provisional signifying in place of fixed meanings. Theoretically, 
this lead us to conceive of mathematical doings as the “making of” 
mathematics, within which geometrical inventing-in-the-act is both 
inventing in geometry and inventing geometry itself. Eventing is making 
present, and present again, by means of re-presentations while geometry, in 
Derrida’s (1962) analysis of Husserls’ work, is born again in and through 
the movements and the un-intended changes that these have brought about 
in the world. Nelly’s hexagon is a re-invention, a finding again of what the 
tangram shapes afford as potentialities, and these events (of inventing (in) 
geometry) are, in their phenomenological structure, similar to that of the 
historical first inventions emerging on a ground of proto-geometrical 
experiences that come from being in the world (Husserl, 1976; Roth, 2011). 
That is, if mathematical invention is characterized by an accidental 
character in the sense that it is strictly unforeseeable from a historical 
perspective (Hadamar, 1945; Pointcaré, 1952), the term “historical” 
commonly heard in relation to long time spans (notable at societal-historical 
levels) also applies to the moment-to-moment temporality of human acts. If 
tracing, for example, is taken as moment in the course of inventing, a 
separation in time between the production of a trace and its 
(re)interpretation (or conversely: the re-interpretation in tracing of 
something previously done, or said, or thought) introduces a generative 
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difference (Derrida, 1993). Naming a configuration turns it into a thing 
about which more is being said as long as inventing “it” is taking place. 
And once all is said, as Châtelet (2010) humorously explains, nothing else 
remains to be done than going to bed. But, Châtelet argues (based on his 
study of great mathematician drawings), when a diagram is experienced in 
its materiality, mathematical possibilities are exceeded by virtuality which, 
as a result of inventing, degrades into new actuality and possibilities. There 
is always and at any moment an interval, a distance that is created with/in 
such mathematical doing, a gap where a new zone of virtuality emerges: 
“this is where a full dialectic of virtuality develops” (Châtelet, 1993, p. 18). 
Moreover, Inventing-in-the-act here actually helps us understand Derrida’s 
(1962) mesmerizing analysis of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry when he 
rhetorically asks: “Must we not say that geometry then an infinity of birth, 
of act of being born, in which each time is announce, while hiding itself, 
another birth? Should we not say that the geometry is en route to its origin 
rather than proceeding from it?” (p. 131, our translation). Inventing-in-the-
act thus phenomenologically resonates with Freudenthal’s insight regarding 
the reinvention of mathematics by the students (e.g. Gravemeijer & 
Doorman, 1999) but without situating it in the often mentioned impasse of 
having to answer how children can be ask to build alone and from scratch 
what mathematicians took centuries to come up with. Mathematical doing 
are inherently creative of one’s mathematics including instances of working 
with others’ traces (carrying on mathematics’ ongoing history). Geometry is 
endlessly born again, re-invented in actual geometrical doings that do not 
establish it once and for all (Roth, 2011), but essentially calls for further 
inventing-in-the-act to bring it to live. Traces of others’ mathematical work 
can set inventing into motion, gets one to “do” mathematics, thereby 
keeping mathematics alive. When someone is active with traces, like Nelly 
working with a tangram puzzle–an invention Chinese were already 
inventing with in the first century–every movement changes the body, not 
only creating new (more or less ephemeral) traces, but changing its 
practices so that “the individual, who develops its capabilities in producing 
also expends these, consumes these in the act of production” (Marx/Engels, 
1983, p. 25). Thinking back though this quote, we realize that, obviously, 
mathematics always not only existed but also evolved through 
mathematicians’ inventing-in-the-act, every invention being the result of 
some concrete and lived mathematical doings. 
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 Meaning is what is produced when a sound complex is attached to trace 
in the world, when a wild otherness, suddenly discovered, is tamed in a 
name, pinned down, captured, comprehended, contained. There is always, 
however, the possibility to once again discover more in those traces, taking 
them up and get the inventing going afresh. This act of finishing, taking up, 
and then finishing again an object is fundamentally similar in regard to the 
work of an Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last theorem (Fermat 
negligently noting in a margin that he already had a proof thereof) and that 
of Mary naming her find, or Kelly offering the concept/category of “true” 
figures with the configuration as an example. The experience of offering 
and receiving something that as known but also partially unknown makes 
inventing (in) mathematics equally available to and performed by all who 
actually engage in mathematical activity. And even though Nelly’s or 
Kelly’s work is not, for someone who encountered such productions 
already, as “original” as the first formulation of the Lindemann–Weierstrass 
theorem (which, however, essentially solved again a problem—the 
quadrature of the circle—so many time “solved” in previous centuries), the 
girls still had to re-discover, to re-invent these in the way geometry always 
is rediscovered and reinvented, as for the first time. Reinventing inventing 
(in) geometry phenomenologically, geometry is on the way to its origin 
because geometry is coming to us, coming to Being in the very acts through 
which it comes to live. Doing geometry is over and over again inventing it 
(Husserl, 1976), while being already within geometry, and thus inventing 
“in” the field of actions it opens for us. As for the social dimension of 
inventing regarding how something comes to count as a creation 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), it can also be re-conceptualized pheno-
menologically in those actions, deemed essential to inventing-in-the-act, 
through which traces are made relevant for oneself or another. Just the way 
we saw it in Nelly’s calling of an “interesting shape”, Kelly’s taking up of 
the “hexagon” confirming the find, or the absence of a response moving 
forward her offer to consider the configuration as a “true” hexagon (a case 
of inventing that did not seems resonate for the others). Thus, we find here 
evidence in support of the conceptualization of inventing-in-the-act in the 
very sense that Merleau-Ponty (1964) and Husserl before him (see e.g. 
Husserl, 1976) suggestions that those learning to do geometry today are 
reproducing the same kind of creative act that originally produced geometry 
during the times of the early Greek. 
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 Finally, it is worth mentioning how the serendipitous aspect of 
inventing-in-the-act we observed comes very close to artistic creation in the 
way great artists—including Kandinsky (1913) and Klee (1953)—report it. 
Providing accounts similar to what we discuss in this article, Kandinsky 
(1913) for example explains: “All forms that I ever used arrived ‘on their 
own,’ they placed themselves complete in front of my eyes and all that 
remained was for me to copy them, or they formed themselves already 
during the work, often taking me by surprise” (p. XVI). That is, even in 
cases of aesthetic productions, each invention is related to but not merely 
derived from preceding ones, and there is interplay between the 
accumulation of minor transformations to the sudden mutation of what was 
there into something new (Dufrenne, 1953). It is always possible, after the 
fact, to find a sort of prefiguration for the new, and it is precisely the 
temporality which makes room for inventing. We observe this not only in 
external accounts on invention, but also in the phenomenological moment 
of inventing: “In short, [the artist] knows the work only when he has 
created it. Until then, he knows only that something new wills itself within 
him and that, because it is new, he must first create it” (p. 34). 
Mathematical work as inventing-in-the-act is artistic in the sense that it is 
an explosion of what is and was is merely possible, breaking from the 
technicalities of logic and proof to step into the creative realm of bringing 
entities to life (Châtelet, 2010). Merleau-Ponty (1964) introduces for this 
kind of phenomenon the concept of pregnance, the productive power of 
explosion at the interface of the visible and the invisible: “My body obeys 
the pregnance [of the visible], responds to it. . . . When the ‘right’ form 
appears, either it’s shine modifies the surroundings, or obtains from my 
body a movement” (p. 259, our translation). That is Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
provided one response to the question of how can “ordinary” mathematical 
action be creative in essence by insisting on the fact that the effect of 
actions always exceeds the intentions, which allows individuals to 
encounter unexpected and surprising results. This encounter with the 
unexpected changes the field within which objects appear, and, therefore, 
the objects themselves; or they change the movements of the inquirer, 
leading to the emergence of new ways of doing. Simply doing (some) 
mathematics, one could then come to see mathematical objects in a new 
light, turning them into something new, and opening for new ways to act 
with or upon them. With our episode, we saw how inventing-in-the-act 
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takes us to consider that Nelly does not merely constructs something 
predetermine, but rather to observe movement until something appears to 
offer itself to her, at which point the orientation in the movements changes. 
A shift has occurred in which a new perceptual arose from the ground. Such 
a gestalt switch through which the invisible becomes visible can occur 
because “every ‘[ful-]filled’ intuition surrounds itself by a horizon of 
potential appearances, every effective presence by a horizon of non-
presence or of virtual presence” (Henry, 2000, p. 53). A similar take on 
inventing in relation with traces is found in the theoretical work of the 
painter Paul Klee (1953), who shows how a line can come to circumscribe 
itself with the present in its absence of an imaginary line indicated by 
secondary lines and so on. In that sense, inventing-in-the-act requires 
thinking the trace as different from itself, which also can be found in 
Kandinsky’s (1913) discussion of the visible and invisible life in painting, 
or the hearable and the silent dynamic force in music. 
 
Coda 
 
The purpose of this article is to show that inventing (in) mathematics 
education has to do with mathematical ideas borne with/in mathematical 
doings. If someone were to make something already conceived in mind, it 
would not be new at all from a phenomenological perspective, and, 
therefore, would not count as inventing. Novelty is not an objective/realist 
quality, but the result of the very experience of the unexpected qua 
unexpected. This means being able to take into consideration approximate 
or momentary creations as integral parts of inventing in mathematics 
education, realizing that it does can take place at any moment in the most 
mundane, everyday mathematical action. As a case of inventing-in-the-act, 
we observed school children coming up with configuration of tangram 
piece that where not intended from the outset, but encountered while fitting 
pieces together (recall Nelly saying: “I’m using the missing piece, they fit 
together!”). Conceptually, we found that inventing-in-the-act as the 
serendipitous, open and ongoing experience of working with traces involves 
the recognition that some/thing is now present, from an indeterminate 
being-affected to the presence as presence, and to overturn it, move it 
beyond what it might have be found/made for, to see it as something other 
than what was. As such, we assert that there is then no phenomenological 
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distinction possible between students or “professional mathematician” 
inventing (in) geometry (or mathematics more generally). This also possible 
because mathematics is never fully invented. 
 On a larger scale, this study is part of our effort to further develop a 
“dynamic” approach to mathematics and mathematical activity, one in 
which movement, flow, and transformation are at the center and origin of 
our conceptualizations. Approaching inventing (in) geometry in terms of 
inventing-in-the-act contributes to that endeavour, which in turn opens up 
for new ways of thinking in mathematics education. Our work with data 
involving a student doing mathematics is crucial to that undertaking in at 
least two ways. First, it illustrates the concrete, substantial, observable 
presence of what otherwise might have seem “sheer philosophical 
considerations” on mathematical doing. A case is made that, in our 
fragment, two seven -years -old students are engaged in the moment-to-
moment of inventing (in) geometry as part of a quite ordinary episode of 
mathematics teaching and learning. Second, it shows how, and for that very 
reason, observing students’' mathematical activity qua inventing-in-the-act 
is a mater of orientation; it is in the way we look, in how we observe. No 
special setup is required to situate mathematics students a creative 
“inventors.” Attending to their mathematical activity in such a way, 
however, gives raise to number of new questions upon which mathematics 
educators are invited to dwell: How to engage with a (mathematics student) 
inventor in the moment of inventing? How to prepare oneself to do so? 
How would the distinction of various forms of inventing be interesting? 
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